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HOW LOW CAN YOU GO (DOWN THE
LADDER): THE VERTICAL REACH OF RICO
SCOTT PACCAGNINI*

I.

INTRODUCTION

On October 15, 1970, President Richard Nixon signed the
Organized Crime Control Act, and proclaimed that the
government can now "launch a total war against organized
crime."' However, twenty-two years later, under the guise of the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), civil
plaintiffs, and not the government, are using President Nixon's
tool on the war against organized crime against non-racketeers
such as banks,' lawyers or law firms,3 accounting firms,4 insurance
companies,5 and securities investment firms.6 What once was a
bill designed to attack organized crime's ability to weaken the
stability of the nation's economic system and promote free
competition,7 now has become a forum for deep pocket shopping
* Law clerk to the Honorable P. Michael Mahoney of the Northern District of
Illinois, Western Division.
1. See DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS, THE LAW OF CIVIL RiCo 2 (1990) (citing Public
Paper of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon 846 (1970)).
Abrams further quoted the President as saying:
[Wie will win this war. It can be done. And the billions of dollars that
organized crime has taken out of American society, what it has done to
society in other ways, its, for example, support of the drug traffic in this
country, in many of these areas where we have seen organized crime
doing so much harm to America, we are going to find now that those
who are fighting against crime will have the tools that they need to do
the job and they will do the job.
Id. at n.3.
2. See American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Haroco, Inc., 473 U.S. 606, 607
(1985) (stating that petitioner was a bank).
3. See Sutherland v. O'Malley, 882 F.2d 1196, 1198 (7th Cir. 1989) (stating
that defendant was a law firm).
4. See Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1359 (7th Cir. 1983) (citing Cenco,
Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding that
accounting firm lacked civil RICO standing to sue its client-corporation).
5. See Ocean Energy II, Inc. v. Alexander & Alexander, Inc., 868 F.2d 740,
741 (5th Cir. 1989) (stating that a party to the proceeding is an insurance
company).
6. See McAdam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 896 F.2d 750, 755 (3d Cir.
1990) (stating that party to the action was a securities investment firm).
7. See Beck v. Prupis, 529 U.S. 494, 495 (Thomas, J.) (citing Organized
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with treble damages as the ultimate "find."8
Nevertheless, aside from the addition of more predicate acts,
the RICO statute remains primarily the same today as the day
President Nixon signed the Act, leaving the judiciary to interpret
the statute's meaning and scope.9 This task has left the judiciary
with circuit splits"9 and a tension between interpreting the statute
broadly, as it was allegedly meant to be interpreted, 1 or
interpreting the statute narrowly in an attempt to adhere to
Congressional intent.12 For example, in Reves v. Ernst & Young,
the Supreme Court needed to resolve a substantial circuit split
involving the interpretation of the statutory language of 1962(c)'s
"to conduct or participate ... in the conduct." 3 However, in
resolving one circuit split, the Supreme Court's interpretation of
the statute created another. 4
Specifically, in adopting the

Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 923) (stating that
Organized Crime's affect was to "weaken the stability of the Nation's economic
system, harm innocent investors and competing organizations, interfere with
free competition, seriously burden interstate and foreign commerce, threaten
the domestic security, and undermine the general welfare of the Nation and
its citizens").
8. See Schacht, 711 F.2d at 1361 (stating Congress "may well have created
a runaway treble damage bonanza for the already excessively litigious").
9. However, this task, as evident by the dismay of many courts, is not
easy. See, e.g., Combs v. Bakker, 886 F.2d 673, 677 (4th Cir. 1989) (calling
RICO a "tormented statute"); Old Timers Enters. v. Int'l Coffee Crop., 862
F.2d 1213, 1220 (5th Cir. 1989) (stating RICO is "an unusually confusing and
convoluted statute").
10. See H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 251 (1989)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that with the Supreme Court's guidance, the
pattern requirement "produced the widest and most persistent Circuit split on
an issue of federal law in recent memory").
11. See Haroco, Inc., v. Am. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384, 386 (7th
Cir. 1984) (stating "RICO's terms are obviously very broad[ ] ... [wihether
RICO's broad terms should be read literally to permit RICO claims in
instances of such 'garden variety' fraud has recently been the subject of
extended debates in the federal courts").
12. See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 183 (1993) (stating the Court
would not use the liberal construction clause "to apply RICO to new purposes
that Congress never intended").
13. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) states:
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any
enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or
foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the
conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering
activity or collection of unlawful debt.
14. Compare MCM Partners Inc., v. Andrews-Bartlett Assocs., 62 F.3d 967,
979 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding defendant's liable where they "knowingly
implemented management's decisions, thereby enabling the enterprise to
achieve its goals"); United States v. Starrett, 55 F.3d 1525, 1548 (11th Cir.
1995) (quoting United States v. Oreto, 37 F.3d 739, 750 (1st Cir. 1994))
(agreeing with the First Circuit that a person "may be liable under the Reves'
operation and management test by 'knowingly implementing decisions, as well
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operation or management test, the Court, in dicta, found that
liability extends not only to upper level management but also to
lower-rung employees of the enterprise. 5 Unfortunately, by not
addressing the issue of lower-rung employees specifically in Reves,
the Court has left open the question: how far down the ladder can
liability be found?
This note addresses how far down the ladder liability can be
found and if liability should even be found below the first rung.
Part I of this note presents the legislative history behind RICO's
statutory creation. 6
Part II presents the pre-Reves tests in
determining liability under 1962(c) and also presents the Reves
test and its reasoning." Part III outlines the circuit split on the
issue of lower-rung participants."' Part IV discuses the problems
inherent in lower-rung participant liability stemming from Reves
and RICO's purpose. 9 Part V proposes a new approach courts
should take when addressing the liability of lower-rung
participants.20

II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
The problem of criminal infiltration of legitimate businesses
was first documented over fifty years ago. 21 Originally, antitrust
laws were used to attack criminal activity in businesses, but the
development of the infiltration of legitimate businesses led
Congress to develop criminal legislation." Namely, Congress was
as by making them'"); United States v. Wong, 40 F.3d 1347, 1373-74 (2d Cir.
1994) (finding "Reves makes it clear that a defendant can act under the
direction of superiors in a RICO enterprise and still 'participate' in the
operation of the enterprise within the meaning of § 1962(c)"), with Goren v.
New Vision Int'l, Inc., 156 F.3d 721, 728 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding "simply
performing services for an enterprise, even with knowledge of the enterprise's
illicit nature, is not enough to subject an individual to RICO liability under
1962(c); instead, the individual must have participated in the operation and
management of the enterprise itself"); United States v. Viola, 35 F.3d 37, 41
(2d Cir. 1994) (finding "[slince Reves, it is plain that the simple taking of
directions and performance of tasks that are 'necessary or helpful' to the
enterprise, without more, is insufficient to bring a defendant within the scope
of§ 1962(c)"); Univ. of Md. v. Peat, Marwick, Main & Co., 996 F.2d 1534, 153839 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding "not even action involving some degree of
decisionmaking constitutes participation in the affairs of an enterprise").
15. See Reves, 507 U.S. at 184 (stating "[a]n enterprise is 'operated' not just
by upper management but also by lower rung participants in the enterprise
who are under the direction of upper management").
16. See infra notes 21-39.
17. See infra notes 40-77.
18. See infra notes 78-105.
19. See infra notes 106-33.
20. See infra notes 134-52.
21. S. REP. No. 2370, 81st Cong., 16 (1950).
22. See United States v. Penn. Refuse Removal Assn., 357 F.2d 806, 808 (3d
Cir. 1966), cert denied, 384 U.S. 961 (1966) (showing government involved in
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trying to prevent "organized crime" from infiltrating legitimate
businesses and "laundering" illegal money through such legitimate
businesses. 3
In 1951, the Kefauver committee24 disclosed the problem of
organized crime's infiltration into legitimate businesses."
Congress' main problem was not only organized crime's ability to
infiltrate a legitimate business, but its power to set up monopolies
and unfair competition as a result of that infiltration.26 As a result
of congressional studies and research, the President's Commission
on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice27 recommended
the use of regulatory measures to control the infiltration of
businesses.
Congress answered with two bills designed to
address the Commission's recommendations. S. 2048, the first

civil actions against two companies to termination violations of Section I of the
Sherman Act); Los Angeles Meat & Provision Drivers Union v. United States,
371 U.S. 94, 98-101 (1962).
23. Senator McClellan stated:
To aid in the pressing need to remove organized crime from legitimate
organizations in country, I have thus formulated this bill entitled the
"Corrupt Organizations Act of 1969." This bill is designed to attack the
infiltration of legitimate business repeatedly outlined by investigations
of various congressional committees and the President's Crime
Commission.
115 CONG. REC. 9567 (1969), reprinted in R.I.C.O. Leg. Hist. at 30.
24. See U.S. Senate Art & History Home, Historical Minutes, 1941-1963,
Kefauver Crime Committee launched, available at http://www.senate.gov
/artandhistory/minute/KefauverCrime committeeLaunched.htm (describing
the Kefauver Committee as a Special Committee of the United States Senate
created to Investigate Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce).
25. "One of the most perplexing problems in the field of organized crime is
presented by the fact that criminals and racketeers are using the profits of
organized crime to buy up and operate legitimate business enterprises." S.
REP. NO. 141-82 at 33 (1951).
26. "In most cases, these are enterprises in which gangster methods have
been used to obtain monopolies so that their vicious practices taint otherwise
legitimate business.
They are able to compete unfairly with legitimate
business men because of their accumulation of cash and their vicious
methods." S. REP. NO. 2370 at 16 (1950).
27. See DONALD R. CRESSEY, THEFT OF THE NATION, THE STRUCTURE AND
OPERATIONS OF ORGANIZED CRIME IN AMERICA, 98-108 (1969) (identifying
four methods through which organized crime usually gained control of
legitimate business: 1) investing profits acquired from gambling and other
illegal enterprises; 2) accepting business interests as payment for the owner's
gambling debts; 3) foreclosing on usurious loans; and 4) using various forms of
extortion).
28. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 187, 208. "Law
enforcement is not the only weapon that government's have to control
organized crime. Regulatory activity can have a great effect. Government at
various levels has not explored the regulatory devices available to thwart the
activities of criminal groups, especially in the area of infiltration of legitimate
business." Id.
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bill, proposed an amendment to the Sherman Antitrust Act that
would bring the full force of the Sherman Act to bear on organized
crime.29 S. 2049, the other bill, was independent of the Sherman
Act, although it borrowed many of its provisions, and focused
specifically on the infiltration of legitimate businesses by
organized crime. These two bills received criticism from the
American Bar Association because of the fear that the
commingling of Antitrust Laws" with soon to be RICO laws might
produce unharmonious results and methods."
Both S. 2048 and S. 2049 died in committee.
Senator
McClellan, in response to the problems of organized crime,
introduced S. 30, which utilized the recommendations of the
President's Commission. S. 30 did not contain antitrust-type
provisions for controlling the infiltration of business, but was a
broad 32based criminal law reform bill covering a wide variety of
areas.

Senator Hruska introduced S. 1623 two months after the
introduction of S. 30. S. 1623 combined S. 2048 and S. 2049. The
Department of Justice criticized S. 1623 as being too narrow in
scope. The Department of Justice wanted a measure that would
punish the control or operation of a business by means of
racketeering activity.
After hearings and deliberations, the
Department of Justice's suggestions were incorporated into S.
1861, which was designed to prohibit the infiltration or
management of legitimate organizations by means of racketeering

29. The government looked to antitrust laws as the answer to the problem
because:
[tihe antitrust laws now provide a well-established vehicle for attacking
anti-competitive activity of all kinds. They contain broad discovery
provisions as well as civil and criminal sanctions. These extraordinary
broad and flexible remedies ought to be used more extensively against
the legitimate business activities of organized crime.
113 CONG. REC. 17999 (1967).
30. The ABA was concerned that if the typical defendant in a RICO type
prosecution was Mafia, and if a RICO type prosecution were brought in the
context of the Sherman Act then white collar offenders who fell into the same
provisions would be treated as if they were Mafia types. Thus, the Antitrust
Section of the ABA did not want to directly apply antitrust laws to the Mafia
because the resulting prosecutions would be Mafia type against antitrust type
defendants. In other words, the ABA attempted to prevent the mix of Mafia
prosecutions with white collar prosecutions.
31. House Hearings on S. 30, 91st Cong., 149 (1970) "The Antitrust Section
agrees that organized crime must be stopped. It further agrees that the
antitrust machinery possesses certain advantages worthy of utilization in this
fight... By placing antitrust-type enforcement and discovery procedures in a
separate statute, a commingling of criminal enforcement goals with the goals
of regulating competition is avoided." Id.
32. See H.R. REP. No. 91-1549 at 4007-10 (1970) (explaining how the bill
covered grand juries, immunity, gambling, and recalcitrant witnesses).
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activity.' S. 1861 was included as Title IX of S. 30,' which passed
the Senate on January 23, 1970 as the Organized Crime Control
Act of 1970.
The American Civil Liberties Union expressed its disapproval
of the legislation through a series of attacks. It expressed concern
that this liberal legislation would extend beyond organized crime
and infringe upon civil rights of white-collar and political activist
defendants.35 Senator McClellan responded to the criticism on the
proposed legislation with four arguments.36 Specifically, Senator
McClellan attacked the idea that RICO should apply only to
organized crime by stating that such an argument: (1) confuses the
occasion for reexamining an aspect of criminal justice with the
proper scope of the legislation coming out of that study; (2)
"confuses the role of Congress with the role of a court;" (3) is
pragmatically infeasible requiring application of RICO only to
organized crime prior to the use of RICO's investigative tools; and
(4) implies a "double standard of civil liberties."7
33. 115 CONG. REC. 9567 (1969) ("The bill which I am introducing today,
the Corrupt Organizations Act of 1969, is in part a product of testimony
developed in four days of hearings on S. 30.").
34. See David B. Smith & Terrance G. Reed, CrIvL RICO, 1-8 (Sept. 2001).
35. The American Civil Liberties stated:
First and foremost we are concerned by the enormous and virtually
unlimited breadth of the criminal provisions of the proposed
legislation... [tihere are no guarantees nor reason to assume that in
times of stress, or where the aim seems laudable, S. 1861 would not be
used in areas far removed from what we know as organized crime.
See Measures Relating to Organized Crime, Hearings On S. 30, S. 974, S. 975,
S. 976, S. 1623, S. 1624, S. 1816, S. 2022, S. 2122, and S. 2292 Before the
Subcomm. On Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary,91 Cong., 268 (1969).
36. 116 CONG. REC. 18913-18914 (1970).
37. See id. Senator McClellan stated the following:
Mr. President, this line of analysis has a certain superficial plausibility,
yet on closer examination we see that it is seriously defective in several
regards. Initially, it confuses the occasion for reexamining an aspect of
our system of criminal justice with the proper scope of any new principle
or lesson derived from the reexamination ... In addition, the objection
confuses the role of the Congress with the role of a court ... [but the
Congress in fulfilling its proper legislative role must examine not only
individual instances, but whole problems. In that connection, it has a
duty not to engage in piecemeal legislation. Whatever the limited
occasion for the identification of a problem, the Congress has the duty of
enacting a principled solution to the entire problem...
The objection, moreover, has practical as well as theoretical
defects, ... (such as the civil legislative demand), deal with the process
of investigating and collecting evidence. When an investigation begins
one cannot expect the police to be able to demonstrate a connection to
organized crime,...

[i]t is only at the conclusion of the investigation

that organized crime involvement can be shown and verified... Lastly,
and most disturbingly, however, this objection seems to imply that a
double standard of civil liberties is permissible. S. 30 is objectionable on
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Acknowledging the arguments and recommendations, the
Senate committee on the Judiciary combined many aspects of the
different bills into S. 30. In S. 30, the definition of "racketeering
activity" was broadened and included more specific types of
conduct.
Further, the "pattern of racketeering activity," as
defined, required at least two acts.
The House of Representatives considered S. 30, and in so
doing, narrowed the definition of "pattern of racketeering
activity,"' removed debts from illegal gambling from RICO's
prohibition against collection of debts, and limited "pattern of
racketeering activity" to require that both acts take place within
ten years. Along with other additions and amendments, the House
passed the bill on October 7, 1970 and sent it back to the Senate as
amended for a vote. The basic structure and scope of the bill had
been preserved with only minor facial changes and amendments.
The Senate, allegedly forced to concur with the House
amendments,39 approved the bill on October 12, 1970 and sent it to
President Nixon who signed the bill into law on October 15, 1970.
III. WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO "CONDUCT OR
PARTICIPATE... IN THE CONDUCT"?

A. Pre-Reves
1.

The Scotto Test

The Second and Third Circuits, prior to Reves, adopted a more
liberal test than some of the other federal appellate courts.' In
civil liberties grounds, the union and city bar committee suggest,
because its provisions have an incidental reach beyond organized
crime ... [hias the union forgotten that the Constitution applies to those
engaged in organized crime just as it applies to those engaged in whitecollar or street crime? S. 30 must, I suggest, stand or fall on the
constitutional question without regard to the degree to which it is
limited to organized crime cases.
Id.
38. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1976).
39. See Toby D. Mann, Legislative History of RICO, in MATERIALS ON
RICO: CRIMINAL OVERVIEW, CIVIL OVERVIEW, AND INDIDUAL ESSAYS 58-118
(G. Robert Blakey ed., 1980). The Senate received S. 30 from the House on
October 12th, two days before the election recesses and only 29 working days
before the end of the session. See 116 CONG. REC. 36280-44876 (1970). Thus,
because of the approaching elections, the Senate was forced to vote on the bill
as amended by the House or face the possible death of the bill after the
elections.
40. See, e.g., United States v. Scotto, 641 F.2d 47, 54 (2d Cir. 1980) cert
denied, 452 U.S. 961 (1981) (finding liability under § 1962(c) when "(1) one is
enabled to commit the predicate offenses solely by virtue of his position in
enterprise or involvement in or control over the affairs of the enterprise, or (2)
the predicate offenses are related to the activities of that enterprise."); United
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United States v. Scotto, the defendant, a union president, was
charged with receiving illegal cash payments in the form of
kickbacks.41
The district court instructed the jury that the
Government need not prove the affairs of the enterprise were
advanced by the defendant; rather, it was only necessary that the
jury found "that the acts were committed by the defendant or
caused to be committed by him in the conduct of, or his
participation in, the affairs of the enterprise."42
On appeal, the defendant argued the district court judge
should have instructed the jury that in order to convict the
defendant, the Government must prove the predicate acts were
related to the operation or management of the enterprise.' The
defendant further argued a sufficient nexus between the predicate
acts and the conduct of the enterprise is needed to establish
liability. The Second Circuit rejected this argument. Rather, the
Second Circuit stated an individual conducts the activities of an
enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity when either
one is enabled to commit the predicate offenses solely by virtue of
his position in the enterprise or involvement in or control over the
affairs of the enterprise, or the predicate offenses are related to
the activities of that enterprise. (Emphasis added).
2.

The Operation or Management Test

Originally established by the Fourth Circuit in United States
v. Mandel," the restrictive (as compared to the other pre-Reves
tests) operation or management test attempted to adhere to the
legislative history of 18 U.S.C. §1962,"5 while also attempting to
decipher Congressional intent and the limits of the statute.

States v. Provenzano, 688 F.2d 194, 200 (3d Cir. 1982) (endorsing the Second

Circuit's Scotto test).
41. Scotto, 641 F.2d at 51.

42. Id. at 54.
43. Id.
44. 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir. 1979).
45. See Mandel, 591 F.2d at 1375 (affirming the lower court's statement
that "[a] comparison of the language used [in the legislative history] to

describe Section 1962(c) with the language of Section 1962(c) indicates that
the words 'operation of any enterprise' were meant to describe the phrase
'conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such
enterprise's affairs").
46. See id.
We find additional support... in the use of the word "through" in the
statute which would seem to require proof of some connection between
the pattern of racketeering activity and the conducting or operating of

the business.

Indeed, this connection must be shown if the word

'through' is to have any meaning in the statute. Without the word
'through', anyone who used income from a legitimate business to
participate in racketeering activity would be guilty of a violation of §
1962(c). We do not believe Congress meant to sweep so broadly,
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Balancing the need to prevent infiltration of legitimate business
by organized crime with the language of the statute, the court
held, focusing on the word "through" in the statute, that the
"conduct or participate" language required some involvement in
the operation or management of the business.47
Similarly, the Eighth Circuit adopted the operation or
management test in Bennett v. Berg,' and later in Arthur Young &
Co., v. Reves.49 In Bennett, the court, in dicta, found that mere
participation in the predicate act, even in conjunction with a RICO
enterprise, may not be enough to support a RICO claim. ° Instead,
to be liable under §1962(c), an individual must conduct the affairs
of the enterprise, which usually required participation in the
1
operation or management of the enterprise itself."
Along with the Fourth and Eighth Circuits, the District of
Columbia Circuit also adopted the more restrictive operation or
management test.52 Specifically, in Yellow Bus Lines, Inc., v.
Drivers, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local 639, the court addressed a
RICO claim based on defendants' actions in conducting a strike
against Yellow Bus." In so doing, the court focused on the word
"conduct"' and concluded, after dismissing various circuit tests
used in analyzing 1962(c), 5 that the statutory language demands
more than a relationship with the enterprise's activity; the
language demands
guidance,
exercise
of control,
and

especially in light of the mandatory forfeiture penalties for a § 1962
violation.

Id.
47. Id.
48. 710 F.2d 1361, 1364 (8th Cir. 1983).
49. 937 F.2d 1310, 1324 (8th Cir. 1991).
50. Bennett, 710 F.2d at 1364.
51. Id.; see also Arthur Young & Co., 937 F.2d at 1324 (quoting Bennett for
the proposition that "[a] defendant's participation must be in the conduct of
the affairs of a RICO enterprise, which ordinarily will require some
participation in the operation or management of the enterprise itself").
52. See, e.g., Danielsen v. Burnside-Ott Aviation Training Ctr., Inc., 941
F.2d 1220, 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding that a "defendant must have not
merely participated in the enterprise's affairs, but in the conduct of the
enterprise's affairs"); Yellow Bus Lines, Inc., v. Drivers, Chauffeurs & Helpers
Local Union 639, 913 F.2d 948, 954 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding "[s]ection 1962(c)
applies when a defendant, through a pattern of racketeering activity, exercises
significant control over or within an enterprise, participating not merely in the
enterprise's affairs, but in the conduct of the enterprise's affair").
53. 913 F.2d at 950-51.
54. Id. at 954 (stating that "[c]onduct" is synonymous with management or
direction) (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 473

(1961)).
55. The Yellow Bus court examined several circuit court tests interpreting
1962(c) including the Second Circuit, Fifth Circuit, Eighth Circuit, and
Eleventh Circuits. The court rejected all but the Fourth and Eighth Circuits'
operation and management test. Id. at 954.
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management." Thus, to be liable under 1962(c), a person must
participate in "running the show." 7
3.

The Intermediate Test

Somewhere between the Fourth/Eighth Circuits' more
restrictive operation or management test and the Second Circuit's
Scotto test stood the Fifth/Seventh Circuits' intermediate test.58
The intermediate test is very similar to the liberal test but for
three differences. First, the intermediate test is a three-prong test
as opposed to the two prong liberal test. 9 Specifically, to be liable,
(1) the defendant must have committed the racketeering acts; (2)
the defendant's position in or relationship with the enterprise
facilitated the commission of the acts; and (3) the acts had some
effect on the enterprise."0 (Emphasis added).
Second, the Fifth/Seventh Circuits' approach is narrower
because it uses the conjunctive "and" as opposed to the disjunctive
"or". Whereas the Second Circuit test requires a finding of either
element of the test, the Fifth/Seventh Circuits' test require a
finding of all three elements to be liable.
Finally, under the third prong of the Fifth/Seventh Circuits
intermediate test, the racketeering activity must have some effect
on the enterprise, whereas under the Second Circuit's liberal test
the predicate offenses need only relate to the activities of that
enterprise."

56. Specifically, the court held "the 'conduct of [the enterprise's] affairs'
thus connotes more than just some relationship to the enterprise's activity; the
phrase refers to the guidance, management, direction or other exercise of
control over the course of the enterprise's activities." Id. at 954.
57. Id. (quotation marks omitted).
58. See, e.g., United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322, 1331-33 (5th Cir.
1983); Overnite Transp. Co., v. Truck Drivers, Union Local, 904 F.2d 391, 393
(7th Cir. 1990).
59. However, writers who believe the test is really only a two-prong test
have criticized this statement. See, e.g., J. Todd Benson, Comment, Reves v.
Ernst & Young: Is RICO corrupt?, 54 LA. L. REV. 1685, 1689 (July 1994)
(stating "[tihe [Fifth Circuit] test purports to have three elements, but, in fact
is a two-prong test. The first element is nothing more than a matter of proof
required to establish any RICO violation").
60. Overnite Transp. Co., 904 F.2d at 393; see also Cauble, 706 F. 2d at
1331-32.
61. See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979) (holding that
"[clanons of construction ordinarily suggest that terms connected by a
disjunctive be given separate meanings, unless the context dictates
otherwise").
62. Compare U.S. v. Scotto, 641 F.2d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1980) (finding a
defendant liable if "the predicate offenses are related to the activities of that
enterprise"), with Cauble, 706 F.2d at 1332-33 (finding liability if, in addition
to two other elements, the acts of the defendant had an effect on the
enterprise).
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The Eleventh Circuit Test

The Eleventh Circuit, pre-Reves, established a "facilitation or
63
utilization" test in United States v. Carter.
As opposed to other
circuits that focused on the "conduct or participate clause," the
Eleventh Circuit instead focused on the statutory word "through."
Even though the Eleventh Circuit's focus differed from other
circuits, the interpretation was still meant to find a nexus between
an enterprise and the racketeering activity. That nexus is
established, the court held, when "the facilities and services of the
enterprise were regularly and repeatedly utilized to make possible
the racketeering activity. ...'S
B. Reves
In adopting the operation or management test, and rejecting
all the other tests (after analyzing the statutory language of
§1962(c), the legislative history of §1962(c), and RICO's liberal
construction clause), the Supreme Court held that to be liable
under §1962(c) a defendant must have participated in the
operation or management6 of the enterprise itself." This requires
that the defendant play some integral part in directing the
enterprise's affairs.' Further, the Supreme Court, in Reves, did
not limit §1962(c)'s reach to only upper-management, but also
stated, in dicta, that liability may extend to "lower-rung
participants...
who are under the direction of upper
management."9 In coming to its conclusion, the Court focused on
the language of the statute, the legislative history, and the liberal
construction clause, which are discussed below.
First, in adopting the operation or management test, the

63. 721 F.2d 1514 (11th Cir. 1984).
64. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) makes it "unlawful for any person employed by or
associated with any enterprise... to conduct or participate, directly or
indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of
racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt." (emphasis added).
65. Carter,721 F.2d at 1527.
66. Allegedly, the term "operation or management" comes from the debates
on the floor of Congress where the members allegedly understood § 1962(c) to
include a prerequisite of participation in the operation or management of the
enterprise. Senator McClellan's comments dictated such an understanding
where it was feared that "racketeering" was too broadly defined. Senator
McClellan stated that a defendant must engage in a pattern of racketeering
and "use [ I that pattern to obtain or operate an interest in an interstate
business." Reves, 507 U.S. at 183.
67. Id. at 185.
68. Id. at 179. See also MCM, 62 F.3d at 977.
69. Reves, 507 U.S. at 184. In a footnote, the Reves Court stated "[wie need
not decide in this case how far 1962(c) extends down the ladder of operation
because it is clear that Arthur Young was not acting under the direction of the
Co-op's officers or board." Id. at 184 n.9.
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Court looked to the language of the statute.7 ' The Court first
interpreted the word "conduct." The Court acknowledged that in
the statute "conduct" was both a verb and a noun and because
§1962(c) uses the word twice, the Court concluded that it was
reasonable to give each use a similar construction.71 Ultimately,
the Court concluded the first use of the word "conduct" was as a
verb meaning "lead, run, manage, or direct." In coming to its
decision, the Court rejected defining "conduct" as "to carry on"
because such a definition does not encompass some degree of
direction inherent in the statute. 2
After interpreting the word "conduct", the Court addressed
the meaning of the phrase "participate in the conduct." Adhering
to the need for a degree of direction, the Court similarly found that
"participate in the conduct" means that one must have some part
The Court rejected construing
in directing those affairs. 7'
"participate in the conduct" to mean "aid and abet" because such
an interpretation would broaden §1962(c) beyond its intended
scope of requiring some part in directing the affairs of the
enterprise.74
Next, the Court reviewed the legislative history behind
The Court focused on congressional debates and
§1962(c).
previous concerns that RICO could be used against legitimate
businesses. To further strengthen its adoption of the operation or
management test, the Court quoted Senator McClellan as
proclaiming that a defendant must engage in a pattern of
racketeering activity and use that pattern to obtain or operate an
interest in an interstate business.
70. Id. at 177 ("In determining the scope of a statute, we look first to its
language. If the statutory language is unambiguous, in the absence of a
'clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary, that language must
ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.") (citing United States v. Turkette, 452
U.S. 576, 580 (1981)).
71. Id. at 178.
72. Id. at 177-78 ("Petitioner's urge us to read 'conduct' as 'carry on,' so that
almost any involvement in the affairs of an enterprise would satisfy the
'conduct or participate' requirement. But context is important, and in the
context of the phrase 'to conduct ... [an] enterprise's affairs,' the word
indicates some degree of direction.") (citation omitted).
73. Id. at 179.
74. Id. ("Petitioners argue that Congress used 'participate' as a synonym for
'aid and abet.' That would be a term of breadth indeed, for 'aid and abet'
'comprehends all assistance rendered by words, acts, encouragement, support,
or presence."') (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 68 (6th ed., 1990) (citation

omitted).
75. Senator McClellan stated:
The danger that commission of such offense by other individuals would
subject them to proceedings under title IX [RICO] is even smaller than
any such danger under title III of the 1968 [Safe Streets] Act, since

commission of a crime listed under title IX provides only one element of
title IX's prohibitions.

Unless an individual not only commits such a
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Lastly, the Court rejected Congress' command that RICO be
liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes. The Court
stated that Congress did not intend to apply RICO liberally to new
purposes."6 Rather, the Court decided these new purposes should
be taken from the statute through interpretation and not through
Congressional intent or legislative history."
The result of Reves, at least with regard to lower-rung
participants, created a tension between the Court's statement, in
dicta, that §1962(c)'s liability extends to lower-rung participants
who are under direction of upper management with the Court's
rejection of interpreting "conduct or participate in the conduct"
broadly. This tension resulted in the courts having to determine
whether an employee taking directions from upper-management
can be liable under §1962(c).
IV. How Low CAN YOU Go (DOWN THE LADDER)?
A. Majority View
The majority of courts addressing the issue of whether an
employee, taking directions from upper-management, can be liable
under §1962(c) have found the employee can be liable."8 Generally,

crime but engages in a patter of such violations, and uses that pattern to
obtain or operate an interest in an interstate business, he is not made
subject to proceedings under title IX.
Reves, 507 U.S. at 183 (quoting 116 CONG. REC. 18940) (1970)).
76. The Court stated:
RICO's 'liberal construction' clause does not require rejection of the
'operation or management' test. Congress directed, by § 1961, p. 438,
that the 'provisions of this title shall be liberally construed to effectuate
its remedial purposes.' This clause obviously seeks to ensure that
Congress' intent is not frustrated by an overly narrow reading of the
statute, but it is not an invitation to apply RICO to new purposes that
Congress never intended.
Id. at 183.
77. See id. at 183. This acknowledgment appears problematic because the
Court is seemingly side-stepping or completely disregarding the 'liberal
construction' clause. The Court stated that allegedly the only purpose of the
'liberal construction' clause was to "only serve [ I as an aid for resolving an
ambiguity; it is not to be used to beget one." However, at the same time the
Court acknowledged the clauses provision that the RICO statute "shall be
liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes." Thus, how can the
'liberal construction' clause serve only as an aid for resolving ambiguity while
at the same time requiring liberal construction to effectuate remedial
purposes? It seemingly cannot, but nonetheless, the Court moved on. Id.
78. See MCM, 62 F.3d at 978; Oreto, 37 F.3d at 750; Starret, 55 F.3d at
1548 and Wong, 40 F.3d at 1373. See also MCM, 62 F.3d at 978 (quoting
Daniel R. Fischel & Alan 0. Sykes, Civil RICO After Reves: An Economic
Commentary, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 157, 192 (noting the "tension between the
direction requirement and statement about lower-rung participants and
concluding that the direction requirement includes both those who direct, as
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these courts have-found that an employee can be liable if they take
part in the conduct of an enterprise by knowingly implementing
decisions, as well as by making them."9
Specifically, in United States v. Oreto,8 ° the First Circuit,
acknowledging that Reves required some part in directing the
enterprise's affairs to be liable,8 held that an individual could take
part in the conduct of an enterprise by knowingly implementing
decisions, as well as by making them." In Oreto, the government
failed to show that some of the defendants participated in the
enterprise's decision making, but the Court held the defendants
liable because they were integral to carrying out the collection
process.'
The First Circuit, to form its conclusion, relied on
RICO's alleged statutory purpose to defeat organized crime.' In
interpreting the statute's purpose, the court stated its belief that
RICO was designed to reach all who participate in the conduct of
an enterprise, "whether they are generals or foot soldiers.""
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit held that an individual could
be liable where that individual participated in the conduct of the
enterprise by knowingly implementing decisions, as well as by
making them." Like Oreto, the Seventh Circuit acknowledged
that Reves requires that the defendant play some part in directing
the enterprise's affairs," but like Oreto, the Seventh Circuit
well as those who take direction")) (quotation marks omitted).
79. See, e.g., Oreto, 37 F.3d at 750.
80. Id.
81. Id. ("[Tihe Court observed that 'some part in directing the enterprise's
affairs is required."') (quoting Reves, 507 U.S. at 179).
82. Id. See also Starrett, 55 F.3d at 1548 (holding "we agree with the First
Circuit that one may be liable under the operation and management test by
'knowingly implementing decisions, as well as by making them") (quoting
Oreto, 37 F.3d at 750); Wong, 40 F.3d at 1373-74 (stating "Reves makes it clear
that a defendant can act under the direction of superiors in a RICO enterprise
and still 'participate' in the operation of the enterprise within the meaning of §
1962(c)").
83. See Oreto, 37 F.3d at 750 (stating "[t]he government did not show that
Oreto, Jr. or Petrosino participated in the enterprise's decisionmaking [sic];
but they and other collectors were plainly integral to carrying out the
collection process").
84. Id. at 751. "Congress declared in RICO that the statutory purpose was
'to seek the eradication of organized crime in the United States'. . ." Id.
85. Id. ("Congress listed 'loan sharking' as a means by which 'organized
crime derives much of its power.'. . We think Congress intended to reach all
who participate in the conduct of that enterprise, whether they are generals or
foot soldiers") (emphasis added).
86. MCM, 62 F.3d at 978 (citing Oreto, 37 F.3d at 750); but see Goren 156
F.3d at 728 (stating, "Indeed, simply performing services for an enterprise,
even with knowledge of the enterprise's illicit nature, is not enough to subject
an individual to RICO liability under 1962(c); instead, the individual must
have participated in the operation and management of the enterprise itself').
87. MCM, 62 F.3d at 977. "To be liable under section 1962(c) ...it must be
shown that the defendant 'participated in the operation or management of the
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nevertheless held liable those who merely carried out directions
given them.'
For example, in MCM Partners v. Andrews-Bartlett,' the
Seventh Circuit acknowledged that the defendants did not manage
the enterprise, but nonetheless found the defendants liable
because the defendants participated in the enterprise's operation
by carrying out the directions given to them. 9
B. Minority View
Conversely, a minority of circuits have held that an employee
taking directions from upper-management cannot be liable under
§1962(c). 9 The Third Circuit, in adhering to Reves' operation or
management test, held "not even action involving some degree of
decision making constitutes participation in the affairs of an
enterprise."' In University of Maryland v. Peat, Marwick, Main &
Co., the Third Circuit held a person is not liable merely because
they provided a service to the enterprise that benefited the
enterprise. Rather, to be liable, there must be a nexus between
the person and the affairs of the enterprise.93 Thus, the court held,
in order to be liable under Reves, the person must "knowingly
engage in 'directing the enterprise's affairs' through a pattern of
racketeering activity." '
C. Adhering to Both Views
Adhering to both the majority and minority circuit views, the
enterprise itself and that requires that the defendant play 'some part in
direction the enterprise's affairs.'" Id. (quoting Reves, 507 U.S. at 179).
88. Id. at 978 (finding the defendant's "participated in the enterprise's
affairs by carrying out the directions given them"). See also Oreto, 37 F.3d at
750.
89. Id.
90. Id. The distinction between operating an enterprise, as demanded by
Reves, or participating in the enterprise's operation by carrying out directions
is quite substantial. Reves demands, as the Seventh Circuit acknowledges,
"[the] defendant must play some part in directing the enterprise's affairs," but
merely participating in the operation of the enterprise by way of be giving
commands or orders seems to go beyond Reves scope. Id.
91. See, e.g., Univ. of Md., 996 F.2d at 1538-39 (stating that [u]nder [Reves],
"not even action involving some degree of decision making constitutes
participation in the affairs of an enterprise"); Viola, 35 F.3d at 41 (stating that
"[since Reves, it is plain that the simple taking of directions and performance
of tasks that are 'necessary or helpful' to the enterprise, without more, is
insufficient to bring a defendant within the scope of §1962(c)").
92. University of Maryland, 996 F.2d at 1538-39.
93. Id. at 1539. "[Bjecause one provides goods or services that ultimately
benefit the enterprise does not mean that one becomes liable under RICO as a
result. There must be a nexus between the person and the conduct in the
affairs of an enterprise. The operation and management test goes to that
nexus." Id.
94. Id. (quoting Reves, 507 U.S. at 179).
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Second Circuit is an indication of the tension created by Reves'
operation or management test and lower-rung participants.95
First, in United States v. Viola, the Second Circuit held the taking
of directions or performing of tasks that are necessary or helpful to
the enterprise is insufficient by itself to create liability within the
scope of 1962(c).'
In so holding, the court, like the First and
Seventh Circuits, acknowledged that Reves required, at a
minimum, that the defendant have some part in directing the
enterprise's affairs.97 However, unlike the First and Seventh
Circuits, the Second Circuit reasoned that finding an individual
liable where the individual did not have a part in the operation or
management of the enterprise cannot be reconciled with Reves'
requirement that a defendant have some part in directing the
enterprise's affairs.98 Instead, the Court held that participation in
the enterprise must be willful and knowing in order to be liable as
a lower-rung participant.'
Conversely, two months later, the Second Circuit, in United
States v. Wong, held "Reves makes it clear that a defendant can act
under the direction of superiors in a RICO enterprise and still
'participate' in the operation of the enterprise within the meaning
of § 1962(c)." °° In distinguishing Wong from Viola, the court
placed much emphasis on the defendant's lack of knowledge and
awareness of the overall criminal activities of the RICO enterprise
in Viola.'
On the other hand, in Wong, the Second Circuit

95. Compare Viola, 35 F.3d at 41 ("Since Reves, it is plain that the simple
taking of directions and performance of tasks that are 'necessary or helpful' to
the enterprise, without more, is insufficient to bring a defendant within the
scope of §1962(c)"), with Wong, 40 F.3d at 1373-74. Reves makes it clear that a
defendant can act under the direction of superiors in a RICO enterprise and
still 'participate' in the operation of the enterprise within the meaning of
§1962(c)").
96. Viola, 35 F.3d at 41. See also United States v. Workman, 80 F.3d 688,
696 (2d. Cir. 1996):
In stating that-for purposes of § 1962(c)-"participation" might include
"the performance of acts or duties that are helpful to the operation of the
enterprise," the charge may have suggested to the jury that a finding of
guilt was appropriate even where the defendant played a quite minimal
role. A defendant might well have performed "helpful" acts without
playing any part in "directing the enterprise's affairs."

Id.
97. Viola, 35 F.3d at 40. "[W]e have recently recognized... that at a
minimum the defendant must '[have some part in directing [the enterprise's]
affairs." Id. (quoting Napoli v. United States, 32 F.3d 31 (2d Cir. 1994)).
98. Viola, 35 F.3d at 41.
99. Id.
100. Wong, 40 F.3d at 1373-74.
101. See id. at 1374 (stating "In Viola,... the acquitted defendant had no
awareness of the overall criminal activities of the RICO enterprise, and was
described as "not on the ladder [of the operation of the RICO enterprise] at all,
but rather, as [the principal's] janitor and handyman.. .") (alteration in
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concentrated on each defendant's role in extorting money from
various individuals and the carrying out of murders on
command. 12 Even though the court in Viola acknowledged that
the defendant was not the kingpin of the operation, it did agree
that the defendant acted under the instructions of the kingpin in
transporting stolen beer and lamps to buyers and returning the
proceeds to the kingpin.0 3 Further, the Second Circuit recognized
that the defendant's actions (transporting stolen goods and
delivering the proceeds) might have contributed to the success of
the RICO enterprise, but nonetheless held that the defendant's
test. 10 4
actions did not fall under Reves' operation or management
Thus, in both Wong and Viola the defendants acted under the
direction of upper-management and in both cases the defendants'
actions contributed to the success of the RICO enterprise. The
main difference between the two cases seemingly is the extent of
the participation in the operation or management of the
enterprise."'
V.

PROBLEMS WITH MAJORITY, MINORITY, AND BOTH

The problem with the majority and minority circuits' views is
that both are trying to apply three lines"° and a footnote0 7 from a
original).
102. Id. The Second Circuit in Wong went through each defendant and
described each defendant's participation in the activity. First, Joseph Wang
was responsible with Alex Wong for collecting extortion money from various
restaurants. Next, Alex Wong collected extortion money from restaurants,
shot the manager of one restaurant for refusing to pay, and helped organized a
hunt for witnesses who saw him shoot the restaurant owner. Last, Roger
Kwok, Chiagn Cheng, and Steven Ng were all soldiers who operated under the
direction of their superiors and committed murders on command. Id.
103. See Viola, 35 F.3d at 43 ("[A]cting under Viola's instructions, [one of the
defendant's] transported some stolen beer and lamps to buyers and returned
most of the proceeds from the sales to Viola").
104. Id. ("While [defendant's] acts might have contributed to the success of
the RICO enterprise, he simply did not come within the circle of people who
operated or managed the enterprise's affairs").
105. Compare Wong with Viola. In Wong the defendant's participation
consisted of extortion and murder and in Viola the defendant's participation
consisted of transporting stolen goods. The distinction is important and the
Second Circuit's disagreement noteworthy because it shows the tension
inherent in the Reves operation or management test and lower-rung
participation. The seemingly only distinction between the "foot soldiers" in
Wong and Viola was knowledge and the severity of the criminal activity. In
Viola, the transporting of stolen goods only equals a mere janitor not liable
under Reves, whereas in Wong the killing on command equates to a RICO
violation under Reves.
106. See Reves, 507 U.S. at 184 (stating "We agree that liability under §
1962(c) is not limited to upper management, but we disagree that the
'operation and management' test is inconsistent with this proposition. An
enterprise is 'operated' not just by upper management but also by lower rung
participants in the enterprise who are under the direction of upper
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Supreme Court case not dealing with "outsider" or vertical
liability. ° The majority circuit court view is problematic because
it consists of applying a strict test very liberally to encompass
more than the wording of the Court's dicta statements allow.'0 9
The minority circuit court view is a problem
110 because it consists of
limiting RICO's reach of who can be liable.
A. Majority View Problems
The Supreme Court, in adopting the operation or
management test, adopted the most restrictive test. However, the
majority circuit court view, in dealing with the issue of lower-rung
liability under Reves, applied the operation or management test
liberally to encompass mere foot soldiers. 1' The problem with
such an application is evident in Reves' demand that defendant
play some part in directing the enterprise's affairs." 2 In MCM, the
Seventh Circuit acknowledged that the defendants did not manage
the affairs of the enterprise, but rather, coerced by a third party,
had participated in the enterprise's operation by carrying out
directions given to them."' But where is the directing of the
enterprise's affairs?.
The majority circuit courts do attempt to limit the test by
management").
107. Id. at n.9 (writing "[wie need not decide in this case how far 1962(c)
extends down the ladder of operation because it is clear that Arthur Young
was not acting under the direction of the Co-Op's officers or board").
108. Id. at 185 (stating "1962(c) cannot be interpreted to reach complete
'outsiders' because liability depends on showing that the defendants conducted
or participated in the conduct of the 'enterprise's affairs,' not just their own
affairs").
109. Specifically, if in adopting the operation and management test the
Reves Court meant to apply a strict application to § 1962(c)'s scope, as
evidenced by the Court's unwillingness to adhere to the liberal construction
clause, then such a strict interpretation should not give way to very liberal
liability.
110. Adhering to President Nixon's call to conquer all organized crime, not
extending liability to those carrying out instructions may limit RICO's
possibilities. See ABRAMS, supra note 1, at 2.
111. See Oreto, 37 F.3d at 751 (stating that "Congress intended to reach all
who participated in the conduct of that enterprise, whether they are generals
or foot soldiers.").
112. See Reves, 507 U.S. at 179 (stating "[o]f course, the word 'participate'
makes clear that RICO liability is not limited to those with primary
responsibility for the enterprise's affairs,... but some part in directing the
enterprise's affairs is required").
113. See MCM, 62 F.3d at 979 (stating "[tihus, even if A-B and FDC may
have been reluctant participants in a schemed devised by 'upper
management,' they still knowingly implemented management's decisions,
thereby enabling the enterprise to achieve its goals").
114. It seems hard to believe that an individual who is coerced into
cooperating with an enterprise would be considered knowingly and willfully
implementing management's decisions.
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insisting that the defendant knowingly implement decisions to be
liable."5 However, not only is such a standard not discussed in
Reves, but such a standard will lead to willful blindness and
subjective probing.1 6 At what point does an employee begin to
knowingly implement decisions? Further, as in MCM, are the
defendants knowingly implementing decisions if they are under
the threat of physical punishment if they do not act?
B. Minority View Problems
The minority circuits' interpretation of Reves' liability for
lower-rung participants is also problematic, but for reasons
different than the majority. The minority of circuits that hold an
employee carrying out directions of upper-management cannot be
liable under 1962(c) carries the risk of excludiag intended
participants under 1962(c)'s scope."' Namely, if Congressional
intent was to defeat organized crime's ability to infiltrate a
legitimate business, a rule not extending liability to soldiers (who
assist in such infiltration) of the enterprise might defeat RICO's
purpose."' For example, in Viola, the Second Circuit did not
extend liability to one of the defendants because the court believed
the defendant was not on the ladder but rather a mere janitor or
handyman."9 However, the Second Circuit also acknowledged that
this janitor or handyman transported stolen goods and returned
cash proceeds to the head of the organization in furtherance of
assisting the enterprise.'
Thus, if RICO's purpose was to combat
organized crimes ability to infiltrate legitimate businesses then
should not this mere janitor or handyman be liable?

115. See, e.g., Oreto, 37 F.3d at 750 (stating that "nothing in the [Reves]
opinion precludes our holding that one may 'take part in' the conduct of an
enterprise by knowingly implementing decisions, as well as by making them");
MCM, 62 F.3d at 978 (accepting Oreto's 'knowingly implementing decisions, as
well as by making them' standard); Starrett, 55 F.3d at 1548 (agreeing with
Oreto).
116. Even more problematic is that not only did the First Circuit create a
new standard but also the First Circuit did not address what constitutes not
knowingly implementing decisions. Is it a reasonable man standard or is it
based on the subjective knowledge of the employee?
117. See ABRAMS, supra note 1, at 2.
118. See Beck v. Prupis, 529 U.S. 494, 496 (2000) (stating that "Congress
enacted RICO as Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970,... for
the purpose of seeking the eradication of organized crime in the United
States").
119. Viola, 35 F.3d at 43 (stating that "[Defendant] was not on the ladder at
all, but rather, as Viola's janitor and handyman, was sweeping up the floor
underneath it").
120. Id. See also United States v. Workman, 80 F.3d 688, 696 (2d Cir. 1996)
(holding that although defendant might have performed helpful acts for the
enterprise, defendant did not play any part in directing the enterprise's

affairs).

The John Marshall Law Review

[37:1

The problem with finding a janitor or handyman liable is that
such liability goes against the Supreme Court's strict
interpretation of operation or management.1"1 Specifically, the
Court's majority did not want to extend liability to all who assisted
in the operation or management of the enterprise, only those who
took some part in directing the enterprise's affairs. 2 ' Therefore, it
appears the minority circuits are adhering to the Supreme Court's
strict interpretation in Reves but at the2 same time may be cutting
off RICO's liberal extension of liability.
C. Both Majority and Minority View Problems
Lastly, the most obvious problem with both the majority and
minority circuits is both are trying to apply three sentences and a
footnote from a Supreme Court case that did not even deal with
lower-rung participant liability. 14 Although some circuit courts
acknowledge the special care needed to transform Reves' "outsider"
liability analysis to the liability for "insiders," such care is
problematic."' Reves' holding is limited to outsider liability and
the Court's statement regarding insider lower-rung participants
was inappropriate under the factual pattern before the Court. 126 In
so doing, the Court created a rule for "outsider" liability that does
not properly apply in determining "insider" liability.
Similarly, adhering to legislative history, the Reves operation
or management test is inappropriate for vertical liability. If
RICO's purpose was to prevent criminals and racketeers from
using profits of organized crime to buy up and operate legitimate
business enterprises,'2 7 and if RICO's authority extends to those
who control or operate such a business by means of prohibited
racketeering activities,
then how can the operation or
management test apply to those already in an infiltrated
enterprise. In other words, the operation or management test
121. This is the immensely cited statement that one must play some part in
directing the affairs of the enterprise.
122. See Reves, 507 U.S. at 179 (stating "on the one hand, 'to participate...
in the conduct of... affairs' must be broader than 'to conduct affairs' or the
'participate' phrase would be superfluous").
123. Id. at 183-84 (stating the liberal construction clause demands
"provisions of this title shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial
purposes").
124. Id. at 184.
125. See MCM, 62 F.3d at 978 (noting "[s]pecial care is required in
translating Reves concern with 'horizontal' connections-focusing on the
liability of an outside adviser-into the 'vertical' question of how far RICO
liability may extend within the enterprise but down the organizational
ladder").
126. There is an ongoing debate regarding holding versus dicta and the role
each play.
127. See S. REP. No. 141, at 33 (1951).
128. Reves, 507 U.S. at 181.
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seemingly is the test extracted from Congressional intent to
extend RICO to those who control or operate a legitimate business
through racketeering activity but the test does not appear to apply
to those already working for the enterprise when such infiltration
happens •or129 for those who assist with the infiltration of the
enterprise.
Before Reves, four different tests had been established in
interpreting the "conduct or participate" clause in 1962(c).13 0 The
result of such a split inevitably led to forum shopping within the
federal circuit courts with the more liberal courts the prize
locations. In a mere three sentences and a footnote the Supreme
Court reopened the door to forum shopping. Since Reves, five
federal appellate courts have addressed the question of lower-rung
participant liability and of those five, three went one way, one
went another,13 2 and one, the Second Circuit, went both.13 3 Thus,
the problem of forum shopping still looms, and until the Supreme
Court addresses the question of how far down the ladder liability
goes, a new test or standard of addressing lower-rung participant
liability must be created.
M
T

VI. PROPOSAL

The problem with proposing a new test or standard for lowerrung participant liability is although the Court in Reves applied a
restrictive test for "outsider" or horizontal liability,13 4 such a test
129. The first line of S. 1861 stated it purpose: "to prohibit the infiltration or
management of legitimate organizations by racketeering activity or the
proceeds of racketeering activity." Id. This purpose seemingly goes along with
the operation or management test of Reves, that being to attack those
individuals or groups who direct the enterprise's affairs. However, again, it
does not address the issue of who is liable once the enterprise has been
infiltrated and there are employees assisting the enterprise with its illegal
purposes.
130. These four tests described above are: strict test, liberal test,
intermediate test, and the other or 11th Circuit test.
131. See MCM, 62 F.3d at 978-79; Starrett, 55 F.3d at 1548; and Oreto, 37
F.3d at 750.
132. See University of Maryland, 996 F.2d at 1538-39.
133. Compare Wong, 40 F.3d at 1373-74 (stating "Reves makes it clear that a
defendant can act under the direction of superiors in a RICO enterprise and
still 'participate' in the operation of the enterprise within the meaning of §
1962(c).") with Workman, 80 F.3d at 696 (quoting Reves, 507 U.S. at 179)
(stating "[A] defendant might well have performed 'helpful' acts without
playing any part in 'directing the enterprise's affairs.'"); and Viola, 35 F.3d at
41 (stating "[s]ince Reves, it is plain that the simple taking of directions and
performance of tasks that are 'necessary or helpful' to the enterprise.., is
insufficient to bring a defendant within the scope of § 1962(c)").
134. See Reves, 507 U.S. at 184 n.8 (stating that "because the meaning of the
statute is clear from its language and legislative history, we have no occasion
to consider the application of the rule of lenity. We note, however, that the
rule of lenity would also favor the narrower "operation and management" test
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appears to be 'problematic with "insider" or vertical liability. In
addition, congressional intent focused primarily on the infiltration
of organized crime into legitimate businesses and to find liable
those who control or operate the enterprise in its illegal endeavors,
but the extent of downward direction of Congress' intent is not
clear.
Thus, a proper proposal must create two tests, one
interpreting a liberal reading 3 ' and one interpreting a stricter (i.e.
operation or management) reading.'36
Because the Supreme Court has already defined "conduct or
participate," those definitions must remain consistent in the
creation of any new test or standard.'37 Thus, to "conduct" means
to "lead, run, manage, or direct."' Further, in the context of the
statute, the word "conduct" indicates some degree of direction.
The word "participate" means "to take part in."'39
A. Liberal Test
Reading the statute on its face, a more liberal standard
appears appropriate.
Whereas the original fear behind the
creation of the RICO statute was the infiltration of racketeering
activity into a legitimate business ("outsiders"),40 the fear with
lower-rung liability is different because these individuals are
already involved in the enterprise ("insiders"). Therefore, the
focus of the new test should be on the disjunctive "or" in the
statute. If the "or" is adhered to, then "conduct" or "participate" is
read separately and liability is found by any action conforming to
either one."' A more liberal test will focus not so much on the
"conduct" aspect of the statute, but rather on the "participate"
aspect of the statute. If to "participate" means to "take part in,"
then such a definition does not require some degree of direction as
held by the Supreme Court in Reves."' Rather, adhering to the
"or" in "conduct or participate," liability is found if an individual
led, ran, managed, or directed an enterprise or if an individual
took part in the racketeering activity of the enterprise.
Adhering to the disjunctive construction of the statute and
that we adopt").
135. See infra, notes 138-144.
136. See infra, notes 146-152.
137. See Reves, 507 U.S. at 179.
138. Id. at 177.
139. Id. at 179.
140. See ABRAMS, supra note 1, at 2
141. See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979) (holding that
"[cianons of construction ...suggest terms connected by a disjunctive be given
separate meanings unless the context dictates otherwise").
142. The Supreme Court appears to have read "conduct or participate"
together where it stated "Once we understand the word 'conduct' to require
some degree of direction and the word 'participate' to require some part in that
direction, the meaning of §1962(c) comes into focus." Reves, 507 U.S. at 178.
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the definitions of "conduct or participate" as defined by the
Supreme Court, the Fifth/Seventh Circuits intermediate test, preReves, would be the best applicable test."' To be liable, (1) the
defendant must have committed the racketeering acts; (2) the
defendant's position or relationship with the enterprise facilitated
the commission of the acts; and (3) the acts had some effect on the
enterprise.'" This test would incorporate the liability of foot
soldiers, but at the same time limit liability to only those who
committed racketeering acts and not merely any act that may
have been illegal to benefit the enterprise. Further, the test would
not demand any degree of direction of the enterprise as the Reves
test does, but rather, the test would only demand some
relationship or position with the enterprise.
However, the
relationship or position must benefit the enterprise for liability to
follow. Therefore, this test would extend to the lowest rungs and
find liable all those who satisfy the test, thereby completely
eradicating all involved in the enterprise.
B. Restrictive Test
Notions of coercion and lack of knowledge may demand that
liability not be so liberal. Rather, lower-rung liability should
adhere to the Court's strict interpretation of "conduct or
participate." First, as defined in Reves, "conduct or participate"
should be understood as requiring some degree of direction and
some part in that direction thereby necessitating liability upon
only those who have taken some part in directing the enterprise's
affairs. 4 ' Thus, liability should not extend to soldiers of an
enterprise who merely carry out directions given to them and who
do not have any part in directing the enterprise's affairs.
Furthermore, liability should not extend to those individuals who
are forced to participate and follow directions of the enterprise
because they too have no part in directing the enterprise's affairs.
In fact, in such a situation, those individuals coerced into following
direction probably have less say then a soldier of the enterprise.
Lastly, because not every enterprise consists of organized crime
groups (i.e. banks, lawyers or law firms, accounting firms,
insurance companies, and securities investment firms),1" liability
should not extend to those who follow directions given to them by
upper-management and whose actions benefit the enterprise, but
143. See Cauble, 706 F.2d at 1332-33; Overnite Transp. Co, 904 F.2d at 393.
144. See Cauble, 706 F.2d at 1332-33; Overnite Transp. Co., 904 F.2d at 393.
145. See Reves, 507 U.S. at 178-79.
146. See, e.g., American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Haroco, Inc., 473 U.S. 606
(1985); Sutherland v. O'Malley, 882 F.2d 1196 (7th Cir. 1989); Schacht v.
Brown, 711 F.2d 1343 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1002 (1983);
Ocean Energy II, Inc. v. Alexander & Alexander, Inc., 868 F.2d 740 (5th Cir.
1989); McAdam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 896 F.2d 750 (3d Cir. 1990).
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who do so without knowledge of illegality.
The problem with creating such a test is that the Supreme
Court adopted a restrictive test used by the federal appellate
courts in Reves and that test does not appear to be working for
lower-rung participant liability. Thus, a completely new test must
be created only for dealing with liability of lower-rung
participants.
Again, following the Supreme Court's interpretation of
1962(c) that the liberal construction clause was not an invitation
to apply RICO to new purposes that Congress never intended,147
the new test that should be administered for lower-rung
participants is whether the individual knowingly and willfully
directed or managed the enterprise'saffairs. The use of the phrase
"knowingly and willfully" eliminates the possibility of any coercive
action whereby an individual must assist the enterprise or face
consequences.148 Further, the phrase allows for a defense of lack of
However, this defense will be objective (i.e.
knowledge. 9
reasonable person standard) thereby eliminating any willful
blindness. The use of the word "direct" in place of "conduct" will
eliminate any ambiguity behind the Supreme Court's definition of
"conduct."
To "direct" implies "to order or command with
15
authority."
Liability only extends to individuals who order or
command the enterprise. Second, the use of the word "manage" is
defined as "to direct affairs."5 Thus, as similarly used by the
Supreme Court in Reves, to "direct or manage" the enterprise's
affairs implies some authority to command within the enterprise.
This test, like in the one in Reves, will not be exclusive of only
upper-management because like the Army or a corporation there
are many levels of authority."2 However, under this test, liability
will not be extended to those who merely follow directions.
Looking at these two tests it appears the more liberal test
would fit better with RICO's purpose and eliminate the infiltration
of organized crime into legitimate businesses. However, 1962(c)'s
application has not been limited to organized crime but rather to
insurance companies, law firms, accounting firms, and securities
firms. Therefore, in order to limit the drive for treble damages
147. See Reves, 507 U.S. at 183.
148. In MCM, the Seventh Circuit stated the defendants were "reluctant
participants," but in truth they were no choice participants because of the
threats they received from the "organized crime" enterprise. 62 F.3d at 973,
980-81.
149. This would have to be an affirmative defense raised in a pre-trial
hearing before the merits of liability can be established.
150. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY, COLLEGE DICTIONARY 389 (1997).
151. Id. at 820.
152. This implies that someone lower down the ladder can be liable but only
if he/she has a position of leadership that allows for some type of managing or

directing of lower situated individuals.
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and the "sue everybody" mentality, the stricter test is more
practical.
VII. CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court in Reves took ambiguous terms in a
statute and attempted to clarify them for future litigants.
However, the operation or management application in Reves
applied to "outsiders" or horizontal participants to the enterprise.
Reves did not involve "insiders" or vertical participants. Thus, the
operation or management test should not and really does not apply
to "insiders" or vertical participants. A new test should apply for
the "insiders" of an enterprise. This test, for practical purposes,
should be stricter then the operation or management test and
should not apply to defendants who were merely following
directions and whose actions helped the enterprise.

